Pharmaceutical manufacturers can receive 6 additional months of market exclusivity for performing pediatric clinical trials of brand-name drugs widely used in adults. Congress created this incentive in 1997 because these drugs were being used off-label in children without such trials.
H istorically, few prescription drugs approved for adults were tested on children before they were widely used in children. The pediatric exclusivity program was conceived to address this problem by enabling extension of the market monopoly on a brand-name prescription drug for 6 months if the manufacturer undertook trials in children. The process formally begins when the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issues a Written Request detailing the qualifying pediatric studies. 1 (In approximately 80% of cases, sponsors propose pediatric studies to the agency prior to receiving Written Requests.
2 ) The manufacturer then earns the extension by completing the prespecified trials, regardless of whether the drug is found to be safe or efficacious in pediatric populations. Some of these drugs have gross sales of more than $1 billion annually in the adult market, so 6-month market exclusivity extensions pose substantial costs to all patients and payers. The pediatric exclusivity program was enacted as a 5-year pilot as part of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997. (PREA) requires pediatric studies for approved indications of drugs without a market exclusivity extension when the FDA identifies a need to improve pediatric labeling. 8, 9 For drugs subject to a PREA mandate, sponsors may propose that 1 or more of its mandated trials form the basis of a formal Written Request for pediatric studies that, if approved, provides pediatric exclusivity extensions under BPCA for completion of PREA-mandated trials. Early studies of the pediatric exclusivity provision showed that some clinical studies provided useful information about the proper dosing and expected outcomes in children. 10, 11 Between 1998 and 2012, 57% of drugs granted exclusivity through Written Requests had new or expanded pediatric indications.
11,12 Through December 2017, Written Requests have been issued for 438 drugs, with trials completed and pediatric exclusivity extensions awarded for 229. 13, 14 Prior studies examining the economics of the pediatric exclusivity program found a variable but lucrative net return. One study of the costs and revenues for a sample of drugs granted pediatric exclusivity between 2002 and 2004 found a net return of −$8.9 million to $507.9 million for 9 drugs randomly selected from 9 therapeutic classes. 15 Another study of 9 antihypertensive drugs found a net return of $14.5 million to $316 million. 16 To systematically generate more recent outcomes from the program, we reviewed benefits and costs for drugs being studied in children and receiving pediatric exclusivity from 2007 to 2012. 17 
Methods

Sample Derivation
From publicly available FDA websites, 13, 18, 19 we identified 54 drugs that received pediatric exclusivity extensions between September 27, 2007, and December 31, 2012, the period spanning the renewal of the program under the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, before the program was made permanent in 2012.
We chose this period to allow for as many drugs as possible to experience their pediatric exclusivity extension periods; the award date may precede the extension period-which begins when the final patent expires-by several years.
Pediatric Clinical Trials
Using FDA medical review documents, we extracted the phase and number of participants of trials completed for the Written Request for the 54 drugs in our sample (for exceptions, see eAppendix in the Supplement). Neither ethical board approval nor patient written informed consent was required because we used only publicly available data and no patient medical records.
Label Changes
We queried FDA's New Pediatric Labeling Information Database to identify whether studies were conducted under BPCA alone or under both BPCA and PREA. 19, 20 We then extracted labeling changes for the 54 drugs within our cohort, including safety and efficacy outcomes. We also determined whether extended or new indications were awarded.
11,20
Pediatric Exclusivity Period and Generic Entry
We identified the sponsor, the date of new drug approval, and the 6-month window in which pediatric exclusivity occurred using the FDA's Orange Book, 21 brand-name manufacturer financial reports, and press releases from generic manufacturers (for exceptions, see eAppendix in the Supplement).
6-Month Revenue and Additional Revenue Due to Pediatric Exclusivity
We determined revenues (earned or estimated) during the 6-month period preceding pediatric exclusivity. Six of the 54 drugs (11%) did not have publicly available revenue data and were excluded (for other revenue exceptions, see eAppendix in the Supplement). Annual revenue data were divided by 2 to approximate 6-month revenue corresponding with pediatric exclusivity periods and converted to 2017 dollars using a Consumer Price Index annual inflation rate (i) of 0. Additional revenue from the pediatric exclusivity extension was calculated using market share erosion, an estimate of lost market share to generic manufacturers 6 months after market exclusivity expires (see Box).
26 Market share erosion represents savings to consumers (patients or payers) had generic entry occurred 6 months sooner but may vary depending on the type of drug and its frequency of use. For example, blockbuster drugs (gross revenue >$1 billion annually) may face several generic entrants on loss of market exclusivity, resulting in accelerated market share erosion compared with niche drugs with fewer generic entrants.
Cost of Trials
To estimate the cost of pediatric trials, we used the mean perpatient per-phase trial costs for 8 disease areas that best matched the indication identified in the Written Request, consistent with a previous study. 22 Cost data come from a March 2015 report from the pharmaceutical industry (eTable 2 in the Supplement). 29 These clinical trial cost estimates cover a broad range of clinical activities, including costs related to investigator and site, patient enrollment, trial procedures, materials, laboratory and imaging studies, and data management. The per-patient per-phase trial costs specific to clinical trials were converted from 2013 dollars to the year in which clinical trials were estimated to begin using a Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate (Phase Deflators) (eTable 3 in the Supplement).
30
Because pediatric clinical trials may cost 2 to 5 times more per patient than adult clinical trials, 31 we multiplied adult perpatient clinical trial cost estimates by 3. In sensitivity analyses, we used multipliers of 1 (industry estimates with no adjustment) and 5. We then inflated all trial costs to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. We accounted for the cost of capital, which reflects the manufacturers' opportunity cost of investing in pediatric trials vs using those resources for other purposes. We set cost of capital at 10%, consistent with industry-wide estimates for large corporations (which made up the majority of our sample), with sensitivity analyses of 5% and 15% (the latter of which more closely approximates cost of capital for smaller biotechnology firms). 15, 22, 28 See Box for more details.
Net Return (Cost to Consumers)
Net return is defined as the difference between additional revenue and cost of investment for trials and reflects the monetary value of the pediatric exclusivity provision. This can also be considered the cost to consumers-a transfer of income from third-party payers and patients to the sponsor. 32 Consumers could have saved this amount had pediatric trials been directly funded by the federal government. Finally, we calculated the ratio of net return to cost of investment.
Results
The 54 drugs in our study cohort are listed in 
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Label Changes
Thirty-one drugs (57%) demonstrated safety and efficacy for children in at least 1 study ( Thirty-one (57%) drugs that received pediatric exclusivity under BPCA had also been subject to a PREA mandate; of those, 24 (77%) received new or expanded indications. By comparison, 7 of the 23 drugs (30%) receiving pediatric exclusivity under BPCA alone received new or expanded indications.
Some pediatric studies identified important safety signals in children (Table 2) . Of the 54 drugs, 16 (30%) had new pediatric safety issues added to the drug label. For example, pediatric studies of sildenafil (Revatio) for patients with pulmonary hypertension identified dose-dependent increases in mortality, 36 while valproic acid (Depakote) increased the risk of fatal hepatotoxicity in infants younger than 2 years.
37
We also observed clustering of pediatric studies for certain disease indications. Thirty-one of the 54 drugs (57%) were not first-in-class to undergo pediatric studies for exclusivity extensions. For example, 4 drugs were proton pump inhibitors studied to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease; all 4 earned extensions, despite pediatric exclusivity awards for 3 such drugs prior to 2007.
13
Trial Costs, Additional Revenue, and Net Return
The total estimated cost of investment of pediatric trials for the 54 drugs was $4.9 billion in 2017 dollars, with a median of $36.4 million (IQR, $16.6 million to $100.6 million) (eTable 6 in the Supplement). Pediatric trial costs for 30 (56%) were estimated to be less than $50 million, and 8 (15%) were less than $10 million.
Six-month gross revenues totaled $29.0 billion in 2017 dollars for the 48 drugs with available revenue data, a median of $342.1 million per drug (IQR, $196.3 million to $773.3 million). Twenty (42%) generated gross annual revenue of more than $1 billion when pediatric exclusivity periods occurred.
The median additional revenue from the pediatric extension was $221.7 million per drug (IQR, $127.2 million to $501.1 million). Thirty-eight drugs (79%) had additional revenues greater than $100 million; 12 (25%) surpassed $500 million. Four (8%) surpassed $1 billion in additional revenues: the antiplatelet agent clopidogrel (Plavix; $2.36 billion), the atypical antipsychotic quetiapine (Seroquel; $1.44 billion), the antidepressant duloxetine (Cymbalta; $1.36 billion), and the proton pump inhibitor lansoprazole (Prevacid; $1.22 billion). The smallest additional revenue was for the migraine treatment almotriptan (Axert; $9.8 million). The most valuable pediatric exclusivity extensions were in the hematology, infectious diseases, and diabetes/metabolic/nutrition categories ( Table 3) .
For all drugs, the median net return was $176.0 million (IQR, $47.0 million to $404.1 million). Net return was positive for 42 drugs and negative for 6 drugs. The median ratio of net return to cost of investment for all 48 drugs was 680% (IQR, 80% to 1270%). Fifteen drugs (31%) had a ratio greater than 1000%.
Sensitivity Analyses
In sensitivity analyses (Figure) , varying market share erosion had the greatest impact on cost to consumers, while varying clinical trial costs had the greatest impact on the median ratio of net return to cost of investment. When we excluded 9 drugs with exclusivity periods ending after December 31, 2017, the overall median net return increased from $176.0 million to $184.9 million (IQR, $49.1 million to $493.7 million).
Discussion
The BPCA and PREA have provided important new information about drugs approved for adults through studies in children. Compared with a pre-BPCA era in which more than 80% of drugs approved for adults were inadequately labeled for children, 32 these data can advance disease management in useful ways. It may not be economically efficient to award pediatric exclusivity to multiple drugs from the same therapeutic class, and only 43% of drugs in our cohort were first-in-class drugs. Among the lipid-lowering statin drugs, 5 received the award (lovastatin in 2001; atorvastatin, pravastatin, and simvastatin in 2002; and fluvastatin in 2005) prior to pediatric studies of rosuvastatin in 2009. 13 Omeprazole, a proton pump inhibitor used for gastroesophageal reflux disease, with 3 other proton pump inhibitors (lansoprazole, pantoprazole, rabeprazole) also receiving pediatric exclusivity during our study period. Studies of these later-in-class drugs pose less risk to sponsors because earlier studies have already offered valuable insights into safety and efficacy. Yet statins and proton pump inhibitors are some of the most widely prescribed drugs among adults, underscoring the fact that 6-month pediatric extensions delay generic competition, with cost and access implications for all patients and payers.
Despite potentially lucrative return from 6 months of extended market exclusivity, use of the pediatric exclusivity program appears to be declining. 15 Each bar represents the net return (cost to consumers) and ratio of net return to cost of investment (y axis) achieved by adjusting a single variable in our analysis (x axis). Varying market share erosion between 50% and 80% changed the $176.0 million median net return from $114.5 million to $229.6 million. When costof capital is varied between 15% and 5%, the median net return ranged from $150.4 million to $192.9 million. Varying clinical trial cost estimates (by using either 5× or 1× multipliers instead of 3×) produced a median net return of between $132.5 million and $209.5 million. When varying market share erosion between 50% and 80%, the 680% median ratio of net return to cost of investment ranged between 500% and 860%, When cost of capital is varied between 15% and 5%, the median ratio of net return to cost of investment ranged from 420% to 900%. Varying clinical trial cost estimates (by using either 5× or 1× multipliers instead of 3×) produced a median ratio of net return to cost of investment of between 370% and 2230%. The characteristics of studies submitted for pediatric exclusivity have also evolved over time. A previous review found that 50% of pediatric studies conducted between 1998 and 2004 evaluated efficacy, while the other half were trials assessing only pharmacokinetic or safety end points. 38 A 2014 FDA analysis of drug labeling changes similarly found efficacy demonstrations in 57% of pediatric exclusivity trials from 1998 to 2012. 11 We found that 71% (100 of 141) of pediatric clinical trials in our cohort were phase 2 or higher. We also identified more trials being conducted per Written Request (2.6 on average in our study compared with 2.2 in the previous study covering 1998-2004) with a greater median enrollment per drug (207 compared with 103 in the previous study). 38 If policymakers determine that the costs to consumers for pediatric exclusivity extensions described in the present study are excessive, an alternative would be to set a fixed or predetermined award amount for each requested study, claimable on successful completion of pediatric studies. Such an approach would not require companies to wait several years to recoup capital invested in pediatric research, and it would be less expensive for the public, particularly for products with substantial revenues, in which the extension of the monopoly creates the largest mismatch between the incentive and the cost. Another approach would be direct funding of pediatric trials through the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This could include increased allocations to the Pediatric Trials Network, which is funded by the NIH's National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.
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39 Because government-sponsored prescription drug insurance programs cover more than 100 million patients, taxpayers already bear a substantial proportion of the costs associated with delayed availability of generic drugs. Federal funding could also expand the scope of studies to include pediatric uses of drugs that are already generic but continue to be prescribed to children without the necessary data. 40 The NIH already publishes a Priority List of Needs in Pediatric Therapeutics for use in this line of research. 41 In addition to prospective trials, increased funding for active postmarket safety surveillance of existing pediatric indications is important, 42-44 particularly because pediatric study enrollment is often not powered to identify less common but potentially important safety signals.
6,44
Limitations
Our study has limitations. The date of generic entry was based on January 2017 patent data that may change based on new patent listings, successful patent challenges, or settlements that establish dates for generic entry. For drugs with no current generic competition, 2016 revenue may underestimate actual earnings during the future time window in which pediatric exclusivity will occur. Because revenue data were unavailable for the exact 6-month time window prior to generic entry, we estimated those revenues using corporate revenue data filed on a quarterly and annual basis. Market share erosion over 6 months may also differ among drugs with differing sales volumes, revenues, and number of generic entrants at the end of the market exclusivity period 45, 46 ; the sensitivity analysis shows variation in the median cost to consumers between approximately $115 million and $230 million when market share erosion was varied between 50% and 80% (Figure) .
Median net return remained positive in spite of substantial variation in parameters in the sensitivity analyses. The ratio of net return to cost of investment was most sensitive to our assumption about the clinical trial costs (Figure) . This result is particularly interesting given that clinical trial costs were conservatively estimated. In addition, because the cost of capital varies by manufacturer and may be lower for research and development than for manufacturing, a 10% rate may represent an overestimate, particularly in the setting of follow-on innovation. 47 Cost of capital may also represent an overestimate if federal funding is used to conduct trials. There may be other benefits for sponsors apart from pediatric exclusivity for demonstrating safety and efficacy in pediatric patients that were not included in our study. A 2018 analysis of labeling changes between 2009 and 2011 for drugs found to have safety or efficacy in children found an increased market share of 2.8% and a median yearly revenue benefit of $3.8 million (IQR, $0.7 million 25.2 million). 48 This study examined "manufacturer incentives to conduct pediatric clinical trials in the absence of legislation like the BPCA and PREA." 48 We approximated the date of clinical trials as from the last FDA Written Request addendum listed on the FDA website, a conservative estimate that may not have reflected the actual start date of clinical trials (Box and eFigure 2 in the Supplement). Yet the median duration between the last Written Request addendum and pediatric exclusivity award was 1.98 years, suggesting relatively prompt completion of trials. Given that pediatric clinical trial costs were not publicly available, they were estimated using mean per-patient costs in adult trials. Multiplying those values by 3 may still underestimate the complexity of pediatric clinical trial enrollment, conduct, and monitoring, and we did not consider the costs of preclinical studies. 15 Other factors, such as the role of parental involvement in care and informed consent, logistical challenges related to enrollment and multicenter trial coordination, and risk of litigation, are important considerations in deciding whether to begin clinical trials in children. We excluded drugs with pediatric exclusivity awards after 2012 to capture the actual end of market exclusivity for as many drugs as possible (there was a median of 4.25 years between the award and the exclusivity period), although this approach limits the generalizability of our data to the current pediatric exclusivity program. Finally, we did not consider tax incentives associated with research and experimentation or pediatric orphan drug research when calculating the cost to consumers.
Conclusions
The pediatric exclusivity extension was drafted in response to a need for studies of pharmaceutical products in children. It has generated new pediatric indications for several drugs, but it has also led to substantial rewards to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Over the long term, direct federal funding of pediatric research may be less expensive for consumers and have similar-or greater-public health benefit. 
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